Disability policies and public views on work disability: A comparative analysis using anchoring vignette data by Yin, Na & Heiland, Frank
42  International Journal of Population Studies   2017, Volume 3, Issue 1
International Journal of Population Studies
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Disability policies and public views on 
work disability: A comparative analysis 
using anchoring vignette data
Na Yin1,2,3* and Frank Heiland1,2,3
1 Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College, The City 
University of New York (CUNY), New York, NY, USA
2 CUNY Institute for Demographic Research, New York, NY, USA
3 The CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY, USA
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and public views on work limitations. We hypothesize that program characteristics are 
related to individuals’ perceptions about work limitations. Looking at how respondents 
across countries characterize identical disability vignettes, we find evidence that 
disability policy dimensions such as policy coverage, medical assessment, and 
vocational assessment strongly predict disability perceptions. We illustrate the results 
in a series of counterfactual policy simulations. Our findings have implications for 
policy design and delivery. The anchoring vignette approach may also be useful in a 
wide range of comparative policy studies.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
Population aging has led to increases in activity limitations among the pre-retirement 
people across countries (Martin and Schoeni, 2014; Global Burden of Disease Study 
2013 Collaborators, 2015). It has presented significant challenges to societies trying to 
maintain a productive work force and fund pay-as-you-go programs supporting older 
individuals such as social security. With recent reforms in many countries reducing the 
generosity of public pensions (e.g., by increasing the age at which workers are eligible 
to draw full benefits), older workers have increasingly sought assistance from public 
disability programs (Duggan, Singleton and Song, 2007; GAO, 2010). 
Policymakers seek to both ensure the wellbeing of older workers with health 
impairments and to improve the efficiency and sustainability of disability systems. 
For example, many European countries now emphasize the importance of supporting 
and encouraging work among those with health limitations (OECD, 2010). Similarly, 
U.S. disability policy, which has traditionally focused on providing income to 
individuals who cannot do any work, is experimenting with providing work incentives 
for individuals with health limitations. Recent examples include the Ticket to Work 
Program and the Benefit Offset National Demonstration Projects (see Livermore et 
al. (2013) for a summary of the main findings from evaluating the Ticket to Work 
Program, and see Weathers and Hemmeter (2011), for preliminary findings from the 
Benefit Offset National Demonstration pilot projects). Appendix A provides detailed 
discussion about the benefit structure of OECD countries’ disability programs and their 
policy lessons. 
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An active literature is devoted to estimating the impact of disability reform on 
behaviors such as labor force participation and program application (e.g., Gruber, 2000; 
Mullen and Staubli, 2016; Wise, 2017). We argue that there is an important pathway 
through which disability policy may influence individuals that has been largely 
overlooked: individuals’ perceptions regarding what constitutes a work disability. In 
this paper, we provide a comparative analysis of disability policy in the U.S. and seven 
European countries and investigate whether cross-country differences in disability 
policies are linked to different views held by the public on work limitations. 
We hypothesize that long-standing institutional differences (e.g., coverage and 
benefit generosity) between the public disability insurance systems in Europe 
and the U.S. affect residents’ perceptions of work limitations, and in turn shape 
beliefs regarding disability. For instance, since many European disability programs 
differentiate by severity (offering partial benefits) while the U.S. only recognizes those 
with the most severe work limitations as disabled (offering full support), Americans 
may consider a person with a health condition that limits but does not prevent work 
as not work-disabled while Europeans may describe him or her as moderately work-
disabled. As another example, in countries with better accessibility, it is more common 
for people to see disabled individuals on a daily basis performing regular activities 
whereas in other countries the disabled individuals might not be able to leave their 
houses as often, which might affect public views on disability.1
To further conceptualize the relationship between disability institutions and 
individuals’ perception of work disability, we invoke the concept of cultural beliefs. 
Culture attracts researchers in many fields, but there has not been a universal 
definition that applies across disciplines (Bachrach, 2013; Bisin and Thierry, 2010; 
Giuliano, 2007). When we refer to (disability) culture here, we follow literature in 
economics (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006) and anthropology (e.g., Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005) that define culture as “decision-making heuristics or rules of 
thumb that have evolved to serve our need to make decisions in complex and uncertain 
environments … manifest[ing] themselves as values, beliefs, or social norms” (Alesina 
and Giuliano, 2013, p. 5).
Cultural beliefs have been linked to the institutional environment: People internalize 
social norms that emerge and develop in specific institutional settings (Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2013). As a result, differences in policy can affect the prevalence of various 
types of social norms. (For example, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) while examining the 
bi-directional relationship between institutions and culture, show that the different 
attitudes between Americans and Europeans toward the poor can be explained by the 
relative generosity of the respective welfare states.) Adopting the same conceptual 
framework, we hypothesize that the disability institutional arrangements in a country 
will play a role in shaping the social norms about work disabilities, as reflected in the 
way people assess work limitations. 
Previous research has documented substantial variations across countries in disability 
assessments that cannot be explained by demographic and health characteristics 
(e.g., Angelini, Cavapozzi and Paccagnella, 2012; Bagod’Uva, O’Donnell and van 
Doorslaer, 2008; Grol-Prokopczyk, Freese and Hauser, 2011; Kapteyn, Smith and 
van Soest, 2007; 2009; Murray et al., 2003; Sadana et al., 2002). However, to date, 
systematic analyses of the potential mechanisms underlying those cross-country 
differences has been lacking. We seek to fill this void by conducting a comparative 
analysis of disability policy, investigating how the different components of the 
disability systems in the U.S. and Europe influence individuals’ perceptions of what 
constitutes work limitations. 
To study individuals’ perceptions, we look at how differently people characterize a 
given level of work disability across countries (disability reporting style). Measures 
of self-assessed disability status, which are commonly available in survey data, are 
insufficient to conduct this type of analysis because they will reflect both the true 
1. We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
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(underlying) level of work disability and a country-specific way of reporting. We take 
advantage of unique data on disability vignettes from comparable U.S. and European 
surveys. We identify rating styles (reporting heterogeneity) based on how respondents 
characterize the severity level of the same vignette person with a given degree of work 
limitation. This is known as the anchoring vignette approach, which has become a 
popular empirical strategy in health and social science research (King et al., 2004).
We find evidence consistent with an effect of disability policy generosity on 
perceptions. Different policy dimensions affect disability classifications in different 
ways. The most influential policy dimensions are policy coverage, medical assessment, 
and vocational assessment. Our findings have important implications for disability 
policy design and delivery.
1.2 Disability Policy and Disability Perception
In this section, we compare the disability policies in the United States and seven 
European countries, and briefly discuss the mechanisms of how individuals perceive 
work limitations under different policy environments.
We conceptualize public policy as the outcome of a process that balances individuals’ 
wants for service provision with the available societal resources’ given preferences 
(ranking over priorities). In turn, differences in disability policies across countries with 
similar standards of living should reflect differences in the public’s (consensus) views 
regarding the relative importance and the appropriate type of work disability support. 
For simplicity, economists often consider preferences underlying a policy choice as 
invariant. However, individuals’ attitudes regarding the objects of a policy are likely to 
be influenced by social norms, culture, and tradition as discussed in the Introduction. If 
so, then we expect policies to also shape individuals’ perceptions, especially those that 
have been in place for extended time periods. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we test empirically whether disability policies impact 
how individuals characterize disability cases across countries. Disability policy may 
provide knowledge—in the form of references or thresholds—on how to characterize 
or classify work limitations. For example, in a disability welfare state that traditionally 
recognizes various extents of work limitations, the society members may rate a health 
problem on a wider (more differentiated) severity spectrum. 
In contrast, in more laissez-faire society disability policy may be very strict, offering 
little support to work-limited individuals and only to the most severe disability cases 
that have little residual work capacity. Under such a disability regime, people will get 
the impression that disability support is very limited and that mild or moderate health 
impairments are neither defined as “disabling” nor qualifying for public support. As 
a result, members in these societies likely apply a higher threshold when classifying 
disability. 
OECD (2003) provides a classification for disability compensation policy for all its 
member countries. For every country, 10 disability policy dimensions are evaluated: 
coverage, minimum disability level, disability levels for full benefits, maximum benefit 
level, permanence of benefits, medical assessment, vocational assessment, sickness 
benefit level, sickness benefit duration, and unemployment benefit level and duration. 
OECD scores the generosity of each dimension of disability policy on a scale from 0 
to 5, with 5 being the highest score (most generous) and 0 (least generous) the lowest. 
The OECD measures are designed to capture not only the formal disability program 
rules but also their implementation and administration. Table 1 provides a detailed 
overview of the classifications of the disability compensation policy dimensions. We 
also list the eight countries in our analytical sample according to their scoring in each 
policy dimension. Below, we provide a comparative analysis for each policy aspect.
1.2.1 Policy 1: Coverage
Nordic countries generally provide full population coverage for pubic disability benefit 
programs, regardless of the individual’s work history and household income. In terms 
of the OECD scoring, Sweden scores 5 for having the most extensive coverage which 
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Table 1. OECD classification for disability compensation policy dimension (based on OECD 2003, Table A2.1)
 5 points 4 points 3 points 2 points 1 point 0 point
Policy 1: 
Coverage
total population 
(residents)
some of those 
out of the labor 
force 
labor force 
plus means-
tested non-
contribution 
scheme
labor force 
with voluntary 
self-insurance
labor force employees
Sweden Netherlands
Belgium, 
France, Italy, 
Spain, U.S.
Germany   
Policy 2: 
Minimum 
Disability Level
0%–25% 26%–40% 41%–55% 56%–70% 71%–85% 86%–100%
 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Sweden
Spain  Belgium, France, Italy U.S.  
Policy 3: 
Disability Levels 
for Full Disability
<50% 50%–61% 62%–73% 74%–85% 86%–99% 100%
  Belgium, Germany
Netherlands, 
U.S.
France, Spain, 
Sweden Italy
Policy 4: 
Maximum Benefit 
Level
rr ≥ 75%, 
reasonable 
minimum
rr ≥ 75%, 
minimum not 
specified
75 > rr ≥ 50%, 
reasonable 
minimum
75 > rr ≥ 50%, 
minimum not 
specified
rr < 50%, 
reasonable 
minimum
rr < 50%, 
minimum not 
specified
 Netherlands, Sweden Spain
France, Italy, 
U.S. Germany Belgium  
Policy 5: 
Permanence of 
Benefits
strictly 
permanent
de facto 
permanent
self-reported 
review only
regulated 
review 
procedure
strictly 
temporary, 
unless fully 
(= 100%) 
disabled
strictly 
temporary in 
all cases
Spain Belgium, U.S. Netherlands, Sweden  
France, 
Germany, Italy  
Policy 6: Medical 
Assessment
treating doctor 
exclusively
treating doctor 
predominantly
insurance 
doctor 
predominantly
insurance 
doctor 
exclusively
team of experts 
in the insurance
insurance team 
and two-step 
procedure
  U.S. Germany, Sweden
Belgium, 
France
Italy, 
Netherlands Spain
Policy 7: 
Vocational 
Assessment
strict own 
or usual 
occupation 
assessment
reference is 
made to one's 
previous 
earnings
own-
occupation 
assessment for 
partial benefits
current 
labor market 
conditions 
are taken into 
account
all jobs 
available taken 
into account, 
leniently 
applied
all jobs 
available taken 
into account, 
strictly applied
 
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany (3.5)
Italy, Spain  Netherlands, Sweden, U.S.  
Policy 8: Sickness 
Benefit Level
rr = 100% 
also for long-
term sickness 
absence
rr = 100% 
(short-term); 
rr ≥ 75% (long-
term) sickness 
absence
rr = 75% 
(short-term); 
rr ≥ 50% (long-
term) sickness 
absence
75 > rr ≥ 50% 
for any type 
of sickness 
absence
rr ≥ 50% 
(short-term); 
rr < 50% (long-
term) sickness 
absence
rr < 50% also 
for short-
term sickness 
absence
  Germany, Sweden
Belgium, Italy, 
Netherlands
France, Spain, 
U.S.   
Policy 9: Sickness 
Benefit Duration
one year or 
more, short 
or no wage 
payment period
one year 
or more, 
significant 
wage payment 
period
6–12 months, 
short or no 
wage payment 
period
6–12 months, 
significant 
wage payment 
period
<6 months, 
short or no 
wage payment 
period
<6 months, 
significant 
wage payment 
period
France Germany, Spain, Sweden
Italy, 
Netherlands Belgium  U.S.
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covers its whole population. Many disability systems (e.g., Belgium, France, Italy, 
Spain, and the U.S.) cover labor force plus a means-tested non-contribution scheme. 
In the disability systems that cover mainly labor force, five years of work are typically 
required to establish entitlements (Belgium and France require shorter contribution 
histories), and some of those countries (e.g., the U.S.) require several or all of the five 
years of work to have occurred recently. Usually the contribution requirements for 
sickness benefits are much weaker.
1.2.2 Policy 2: Minimum Disability Level
The U.S. federal disability system intends to award benefits only to the individuals who 
are fully and permanently disabled. It does not allow partial or temporary disabilities. 
The U.S. scores the lowest by the OECD classification for its strictest “minimum 
disability level”. To receive any disability benefits, an American must have at least 
71%–85% disability level, compared to only 0%–25% for a German, a Dutch, or a 
Swede; 26%–40% for a Spaniard; and 56%–70% for a Belgian, French or an Italian (we 
refer interested readers to Yin (2015) for a detailed analysis of the incentives provided 
by the U.S. all-or-nothing disability system in contrast with the European partial 
disability system and for a simulation of the effects of introducing partial benefits into 
the U.S. system on application behavior and employment).
Most countries with such systems, including some Nordic (e.g., Sweden), western 
(e.g., Germany, and the Netherlands), and central and eastern European countries, 
offer a full benefit to those assessed to be incapable of work, as well as various partial 
benefits consistent with reduced work capacity. They offer one (e.g., Germany) to 
four different levels (e.g., Sweden) of partial benefits and in some cases offer finer 
gradations (e.g., the Netherlands). 
Other countries, including France and Spain, have a quasi-partial benefit for people 
who are unable to work in their usual occupation and a full benefit only for those 
unable to work in any occupation. Hence, the capacity threshold is the same for both 
benefits but the reference is different. The partial benefit is allowed to be supplemented 
to some extent by earnings from a job in another occupation. 
Even European countries that do not offer partial benefits as part of their main 
disability program, such as Belgium and Italy, have universal sickness programs as 
a precursor to their long-term disability programs and also more alternative public 
programs to complement their disability program. For example, while the Italian 
disability pension scheme awards full benefits only to people totally unable to work, a 
means-tested disability allowance compensates for partial work capacity loss. We refer 
interested readers to OECD (2010) for a detailed discussion about OECD countries’ 
recent experience and policy lessons in reforming their disability programs.
1.2.3 Policy 3: Disability Level for Full Disability
Despite the relatively lenient standard used in Europe, compared to the U.S., in 
awarding disability benefits to people with less severe work limitations (reflected in 
the lower minimum disability level, higher and more durable sickness benefits, and 
more generous disability benefits than unemployment benefits), European countries 
require a higher or similar disability severity level to qualify for full disability benefits. 
 5 points 4 points 3 points 2 points 1 point 0 point
Policy 10: 
Unemployment 
Benefit (UE) 
Level and 
Duration
DI > UE 
level, short 
duration of 
unemployment
DI > UE 
level, long 
duration of 
unemployment
similar 
levels, short 
duration of 
unemployment
similar 
levels, long 
duration of 
unemployment
DI < UE 
level, short 
duration of 
unemployment
DI < UE 
level, long 
duration of 
unemployment
  Spain Italy, Sweden
Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, 
Netherlands
U.S.  
Note: rr = replacement rate; DI = Disability benefit
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For example, Sweden requires as high as 86%–99% disability level for full disability 
benefits while its minimum disability level is only 0%–25%. The U.S. system does not 
offer benefits for mildly or moderately work-limited individuals. It allows disability 
benefits only to those with a disability level of 71%–85% or higher. 
1.2.4 Policies 4 and 5: Maximum Benefits and Permanence of Benefits
According to the proportion of the work earnings that can be replaced by the maximum 
benefit level, Sweden and Netherlands rank the highest with the most generous 
replacement rate (≥75%), and the U.S. sets a moderate replacement rate of 50%–75%, 
the same as the rate in France and Italy. 
The outflow from disability rolls back to employment is almost zero in all the 
countries, not only in the country where the disability compensation is long-term 
(e.g., strictly permanent in Spain; de facto permanent in Belgium and U.S.) but also 
in countries where disability benefits are supposed to be temporary (unless for fully 
disabled) such as in Sweden, France, Germany and Italy. In most countries, periodic 
legal reviews are required on disability beneficiaries but in practice they rarely occur. 
1.2.5 Policies 6 and 7: Medical Assessment and Vocational Assessment
In most countries, the medical assessment is performed by insurance doctors. 
However, countries differ in accounting for the opinion of treating doctors. In most of 
the countries we study, such opinion is not taken into account in disability assessments. 
Germany and Sweden weigh in the medical evaluation. In the U.S., the disability 
determination relies on the applicants’ treating doctors’ opinion predominantly. On this 
policy measure, the U.S. takes the lead in leniency. While the treating doctors may be 
better informed about the applicant’s medical problems, there are also concerns that the 
treating doctors are too familiar with the applicant to make an objective assessment. 
In terms of vocational assessment, Sweden, like the U.S., takes into account all the 
jobs available in the national economy, whereas some other countries, such as Belgium 
and France, use one’s previous earnings/occupations as reference in evaluating one’s 
residual earning/work capacity.
1.2.6 Policies 8 and 9: Sickness Benefits
Sickness benefits in many countries usually target individuals with less severe 
work limitations and serve as a precursor to long-term disability programs. In the 
Netherlands, nearly all employees receive 100 percent wage replacement (70 percent 
sickness benefit topped up by collective bargaining to 100 percent of the wage) 
during the entire sickness period. Germany and Sweden have a higher benefit rate for 
sickness than for disability, while in the southern European countries sickness benefits 
are usually much lower than disability benefits. The U.S. does not have any sickness 
benefit program although some employers and five states provide short-term disability 
benefits. 
1.2.7 Policy 10: Unemployment Benefits
A worker who suffers health impairment and job separation but still has residual work 
capacity may choose to apply for unemployment benefits or partial disability benefits. 
This is mostly likely the case in European countries whose disability systems offer 
partial benefits. In the U.S., the disability system awards benefits only to the fully 
disabled individuals who are not supposed to qualify for any unemployment benefits. 
In Spain, disability benefits are more generous than unemployment benefits. Sweden 
offers similar levels of disability benefits and unemployment benefits for a resident 
but the duration is longer for disability benefits. The U.S. is one of the few developed 
countries where disability benefit levels are significantly lower than unemployment 
benefit levels, although the duration for unemployment benefits is rather short. 
By summing up the scores in the 10 dimensions discussed above, we obtain an 
overall policy generosity value for each country. The U.S. ranks as the least generous 
Disability policies and public views on work disability...
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disability system (index = 21) and Sweden ranks the most generous (index = 34). 
However, countries rank differently in each specific policy dimension. Some policy 
dimensions, such as Policies 2, 8, 9 and 10, are highly correlated, as evidenced 
by the magnitudes of the correlation coefficients (0.7 or more between any two). 
Moreover, these four policy dimensions affect the vignettes’ ratings in a similar 
fashion, as indicated by the correlation coefficients between each policy dimension 
and the vignettes classifying (Appendix Table A1). In our estimation and policy 
simulation shown later, we group these highly correlated policy dimensions to reduce 
collinearity. More importantly, these four aspects likely reflect how a country treats 
milder disability cases, as the policies regarding the minimum disability level (Policy 
2), sickness benefits (Policies 8 and 9), and unemployment benefits (Policy 10) target 
partial or temporary disability cases. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the 
data and the anchoring vignette approach. In Section 3, we present estimation results 
and policy simulation results. Section 4 provides further discussion about the results 
and concludes. 
2 Data and Method
2.1 Study Sample
To study individuals’ perceptions, we look at how differently people characterize a 
given level of work disability across countries. Measures of self-assessed disability 
status, which are commonly available in survey data, are insufficient to conduct 
this type of analysis because they will reflect both the true level of work disability 
and reporting styles. We take advantage of unique data on disability vignettes from 
comparable U.S. and European surveys, and use vignette data to study reporting 
heterogeneity. A vignette describes the work limitation of a hypothetical person. A 
respondent is asked to evaluate the severity of the vignette work limitation on the 
same five-point scale used for their own health assessment. Since the vignettes are 
identical for all the respondents, the differences in respondents’ evaluations must be 
due to different reporting styles. We hypothesize that the scale that the respondents use 
to classify the severity of a given vignette character’s work limitation is a function of 
the country’s disability policy, particularly a severity classification scale used by their 
country’s disability system.
We use the 2004 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a bi-annual panel 
with a representative sample of the U.S. population aged over 50 and their spouses. 
It has been conducted by the University of Michigan since 1992. The information 
collected includes health, socio-economic status, and social program participation. 
We use a subsample of respondents who first completed a face-to-face interview and 
later completed a leave-behind questionnaire that consists of a series of work disability 
vignettes. We use the 2004 wave because it is the only year in the panel when a 
vignette questionnaire was given to a random subgroup of respondents.
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a longitudinal 
dataset on European citizens of aged 50 and older and their spouses. We use the 
2004 wave of the survey. SHARE was purposely modeled after the HRS and follows 
a common set-up across all countries with the goal of facilitating cross-country 
research. For a subset of countries that agreed to participate, SHARE included a set 
of self-assessments and vignette questions on work limitations as part of a drop-
off questionnaire. The eight countries that participated in this vignette experiment 
were Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden. 
The work disability vignettes were identical to the work disability vignettes in the 
HRS leave-behind questionnaire. In our analysis, we exclude Greece because the 
comparable index for the disability policy generosity is not available in the OECD 
report.
Yin N and Heiland F
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2.2 Measurement
The work disability vignettes describe work limitation of a hypothetical character in 
three domains: pain, depression, and cardiovascular health. In each domain, several 
vignette questions are asked. We use the nine vignettes common to the HRS and 
SHARE surveys. The text for all the vignettes is provided in Table 2. 
Table 2. Vignettes text in the HRS/SHARE questionnaires
Pain Vignettes:
1 [Name] has almost constant pain in her back and this sometimes prevents her from doing 
her work.
2 [Name] suffers from back pain that causes stiffness in her back especially at work but 
is relieved with low doses of medication. She does not have any pains other than this 
generalized discomfort.
3 [Name] has pain in his back and legs, and the pain is present almost all the time. It gets 
worse while he is working. Although medication helps, he feels uncomfortable when 
moving around, holding and lifting things at work.
Cardiovascular Vignettes:
1 [Name] has had heart problems in the past and he has been told to watch his cholesterol 
level. Sometimes if he feels stressed at work, he feels pain in his chest and occasionally 
in his arms.
2 [Name] has been diagnosed with high blood pressure. His blood pressure goes up 
quickly if he feels under stress. Tom does not exercise much and is overweight.
3 [Name] has undergone triple bypass heart surgery. He is a heavy smoker and still 
experiences severe chest pain sometimes.
Depression Vignettes:
1 [Name] feels worried all the time. She gets depressed once a week at work for a couple 
of days in a row, thinking about what could go wrong and that her boss will disapprove 
of her condition. But she is able to come out of this mood if she concentrates on 
something else.
2 [Name] has mood swings on the job. When she gets depressed, everything she does at 
work is an effort for her and she no longer enjoys her usual activities at work. These 
mood swings are not predictable and occur two or three times during a month.
3 [Name] generally enjoys her work. She gets depressed every three weeks for a day or 
two and loses interest in what she usually enjoys but is able to carry on with her day-to-
day activities on the job.
For each vignette, the respondent is asked: “How much is he or she limited in 
the kind or amount of work he or she could do?” The answer follows a five-point 
scale: (1) None; (2) Mild; (3) Moderate; (4) Severe; and (5) Extreme/Cannot do any 
work. Preceding the vignette questions, respondents are asked about their own work 
limitations: “Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or 
amount of work you can do?” with the same answer categories.
Using vignette data, we can identify the reporting heterogeneity for a standardized 
disability scenario across countries. Figure 1 uses one vignette (Pain Vignette No. 2) 
as an example to show the different reporting styles for an identical disability scenario. 
This vignette reads:
[Name] suffers from back pain that causes stiffness in her back especially at work 
but is relieved with low doses of medication. She does not have any pains other than 
this generalized discomfort.
The contrast between countries is striking in how respondents classify the same 
vignette: More than 25 percent of Americans, compared to only less than 10 percent 
of Europeans, rate this vignette as not disabled at all. At the other end of the spectrum, 
as high as 45 percent of Swedes rate this vignette as severely disabled while only 3 
percent of Americans rate so. 
In Figures 2-1 and 2-2, pooling data on all the nine vignettes together, we observed 
considerable differences in how residents across countries characterize the work 
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Figure 1. Classification for Pain Vignette No. 2 by country
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a certain severity level. 
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limitation severity in these vignettes. European respondents, compared to Americans, 
tend to classify a vignette as more work-limiting. American respondents are the least 
generous overall in rating work limitations, followed by the Italians, the Belgians, 
the Dutch, and the French. The Swedes and the Spaniards are at the other end of 
the spectrum and inclined to rate a given work limitation as more severe. German 
respondents are in the middle.
These patterns are notable in light of our discussion of disability program generosity. 
More inclusive rating scales are associated with more generous disability regimes, 
as indicated by the fact that the country ranking according to the inclusiveness of 
disability rating is in line with the ranking in terms of the generosity of the country’s 
disability system. 
Figure 2-1 shows the correlation between the generosity of disability system and 
disability vignette rating. The horizontal axis represents a country’s disability policy 
generosity index. The vertical axis refers to the percentage of respondents in a country 
who classify a vignette as not at all limited. Each diamond in the graph represents 
the rating for a specific vignette. There are apparent variations between countries 
with different disability policy generosity in classifying the severity of the same 
disability vignettes. The difference between the U.S. and other European countries in 
rating styles is striking. The graph indicates a weak and negative correlation between 
disability policy and disability ratings. That is, more generous disability policy seems 
to be generally associated with more inclusive disability classifying styles. Together 
with Figure 2-2, the direction of the correlations shows that respondents under more 
generous disability regimes are more likely to report the same vignettes as more 
work limiting. The weak strength of the correlations may have to do with how the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of a population are related to the 
perception of popular views. Next we will estimate the effects of disability policy 
generosity on reporting heterogeneity while controlling for a series of respondents’ 
characteristics. We test whether disability policy generosity predicts reporting styles 
and whether the predictive power is robust to including the respondents’ individual 
level factors. 
2.3 Covariates
We test a model with a detailed set of individual-level and country-level factors. 
Specifically, the model includes standard demographic covariates: age dummies, 
education (in years), dummies for being female, and a series of health indicators 
(dummies for high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung problems, heart problems, 
arthritis, obesity, the number of ADL limitations, and the number of IADL limitations). 
We also include dummies for (last) occupation (technical/sales/administrative 
support, service, farming/fishing/forestry, precision production/craft/repair, operators/
fabricators/laborers, elementary occupation, and managerial/professional specialty as 
omitted/reference occupation). Past occupation is expected to be an important predictor 
of a person’s risk of having a work limitation. The severity of work limitations is a 
function not only of the health problems but also of the type of work engaged.
With respect to variation at the country-level, we include a set of variables describing 
how a country scores in terms of disability policy generosity (coverage and maximum 
benefit level, disability level for full benefits, permanence of benefits, medical 
assessment, vocational assessment, minimum disability level and sickness benefit, and 
unemployment benefit level and duration). 
2.4 Statistical Approach
Standard ordered regression models (e.g. ordered probit) are often used to analyze self-
reported work limitation on a five-point severity scale: 
        (1)( ) ( )ksiiksi xkh µεβµ <+≤== −1PrPr
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where     is respondent i’s self-reported severity of work limitation, k is the severity 
level ranging from 1 = none to 5 = extreme, xi is a vector of observed characteristics for 
respondent i, and     is a random error term. µk refers to the cut-point between severity 
categories on the reporting scale.
The model estimates the probability of a respondent reporting a given category of 
severity for their work limitation along a latent (continuous) index of work limitation 
severity that is a function of their individual characteristics. The model also estimates 
the cut-points, µ1 to µ4, as the model parameters, representing the thresholds at which a 
respondent would change their work limitation ratings along the latent index. 
The model assumes that cut-points are constant across individuals. That is, 
the locations of the cut-points are invariant across respondents (i.e., reporting 
homogeneity). If this assumption does not hold, in particular, if the cut-points vary 
with the respondents’ characteristic xi, then imposing this assumption will lead to 
biased estimates of the coefficient β. This is because β will reflect both health effects 
(effects of covariate xi on work limitation severity) and reporting effects (effects of 
covariate xi on the cut-points). 
To test and estimate flexible models that allow the cut-points to vary with 
respondents’ characteristics, we will need external information to identify the 
parameters in the cut-points equations. Vignette data can be used as such external 
information to model the cut-points as functions of respondent characteristics. 
Respondents are asked to rate identical vignette characters’ work limitations. The 
vignettes are fixed, so the variations in ratings represent differences in response scales 
used by respondents.
In a generalized ordered probit model, we estimate respondents’ severity rating of 
the vignette character’s work limitation:
where
                                (2)
Each vignette, αν, is constant, plus a random error, εν. The model estimates the 
probability of a respondent reporting a given severity category for the vignette 
character’s work limitation, allowing the location of cut-points to vary by respondents’ 
characteristics. Specifically, the vignette rating is estimated as a function of a vignette 
dummy with each cut-point separately estimated as a function of respondents’ 
characteristics which includes both individual-level factors and country-level factors. 
The threshold equation (2) is estimated separately for each of the four cut-points, 
µ1 to µ4, which is determined by respondent i’s characteristic xi, disability policy 
generosity of country c in which the respondent resides, zc, and other country-specific 
factors summarized in a vector of country indicator, c. Our main interest, the effect 
of disability generosity, δk, reflects the shift of the cut-point µk as the disability policy 
generosity score varies. A negative estimate of δk would suggest that respondents under 
a more generous disability regime apply a lower threshold to classify the disability 
severity level k, that is, they are more likely to evaluate a given vignette person as 
more severely work limited. The estimated coefficients for the four cut-point equations 
are presented in Table 4. 
Finally, we impose the cut-points, which are estimated based on respondents’ ratings 
of the vignette characters’ work limitations, on the model that estimates respondents’ 
ratings of their own work limitations (equation (1)). The two models, equations (1) 
and (2), are jointly estimated with the Hierarchical Ordered Probit (HOPIT) procedure 
suggested by King et al. (2004). The vignette model, equation (2), estimates the four 
cut-points as functions of respondents’ characteristics, thus allowing for reporting 
heterogeneity. The self-reported work limitation model, equation (1), represents 
the relationship between the respondents’ own work limitation severity and their 
characteristics, with reporting cut-points determined by the vignette model. The 
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vignette data and approach makes it possible to separately identify health effects 
and reporting effects rather than a mixture. We illustrate this set of results with 
counterfactual policy simulations in the Results section. Specifically we focus on the 
disability policy effects on the reporting scale which in turn shifts the distribution of 
self-reported disability in the country. 
3 Results
3.1 Sample Description
The descriptive statistics by country for our analytical sample are provided in Table 3. 
The table shows large differences in years of education, with low means in the southern 
European countries. There are also obvious differences in the age composition, with, 
for example, relatively few 66–70 year olds in Sweden. Most chronic conditions are 
much more prevalent in the U.S. than in European countries. Still, the distribution of 
self-reported severity of work disability in the U.S. is quite similar to what is observed 
in European countries overall (columns “U.S.” vs. “Europe”). However, there are 
notable differences in the raw distributions across the seven European populations. 
For example, while all distributions are fairly right-skewed, Sweden are particularly 
concentrated at “none” and the Netherlands is very concentrated at “none” and “mild”, 
while the distribution is relatively more equal across the five categories in Belgium. 
3.2 Predicting Reporting Scales: Results from Regression Analysis
Tables 4 provides the regression estimates of the respondents’ reporting scales using 
their ratings on the disability vignettes (n = 6,652). The estimated effects from four 
cut-point equations are listed from left to right for cut-point 1 (“not at all limited” to 
“mildly limited”) to cut-point 4 (“severely limited” to “extremely limited”). As shown 
in equation (2), the left hand side of each cut-point equation is the location of the cut-
point on the severity spectrum. Controls include a detailed set of individual-level and 
country-level factors. The four cut-point equations are estimated jointly as the four cut-
points together determine an individual’s response scale. 
In Table 4, a negative coefficient suggests that the respondents apply a lower 
cut-point when determining the severity level of the work limitation, indicating a 
more generous reporting style. The results are consistent with systematic reporting 
heterogeneity at the individual and country level as some of the covariates are found to 
be predictive of the location of the cut-points. We are particularly interested in, and we 
show the results on, how the variation in disability policy generosity across countries 
predicts people’s disability reporting scales.
Some of the policy dimensions are highly correlated, as evidenced by the magnitudes 
of the correlation coefficients between them. The policies, such as minimum disability 
level, sickness benefit level and duration, and unemployment benefit level and duration 
(relative to disability benefits), are strongly and positively correlated, as the correlation 
coefficients between any two of those dimensions are about 0.7 or more. Moreover, 
these policy dimensions affect the vignettes’ ratings in the similar fashion, as indicated 
by the correlation coefficients between each policy dimension and the vignettes 
classifying. In addition, policy dimensions such as coverage and maximum benefit 
level are also highly correlated. Therefore, in our regression estimation, we group the 
correlated policy dimensions to address the potential collinearity.
As shown in Table 4, more extensive coverage and higher maximum benefit level 
predict more inclusive rating styles at all four cut-points, that is, over the whole 
work limitation severity spectrum. Permanence of the benefits is also associated 
with applying lower thresholds, with the strongest effects at the middle of the work 
limitation spectrum. Easier entry into disability programs with a mild work limitation, 
reflected in lower minimum disability level, more generous sickness benefits, and 
better disability benefits compared to unemployment benefits, predicts more inclusive 
rating styles for work limitation severity.
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Table 3. Sample means by country
 Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden U.S. Europe
Demographics and Education
Female 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.55
Age 63.9 64.9 63.8 63.7 62.8 64.8 64.1 64.6 64.1
Age 50–55 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22
Age 56–60 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.23 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.12 0.20
Age 61–65 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.17
Age 66–70 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.23 0.15
Age 70+ 0.27 0.30 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.26
Years of education 10.2  8.3 13.1 7.2  11.5 7.1 10.4 12.7 9.6
Health
High blood pressure 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.24 0.34 0.30 0.52 0.30
Diabetes 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.09
Cancer 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.06
Lung problems 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06
Heart conditions 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.12
Arthritis 0.24 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.27 0.09 0.54 0.22
Number of ADL limitations 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.22 0.13
Number of IADL limitations 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.10
Obesity 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.30 0.17
Self-reported work limitation
     None 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.47 0.54 0.45 0.56 0.45 0.48
     Mild 0.36 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.23 0.26
     Moderate 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.18 0.16
     Severe 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07
     Extreme 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.02
Occupation
Managerial/Professional specialty 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.10 0.28 0.27 0.19
Technical/Sales/Administrative 
support 0.23 0.32 0.28 0.15 0.23 0.09 0.27 0.22 0.23
Service 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.11
Farming/Fishing/Forestry 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.04
Precision production/Craft/Repair 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.12
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.07
Elementary occupation 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.11
Occupation info missing 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.12 0.12
No. of observations 543 833 489 426 508 430 402 3021 3631
A more lenient medical assessment regime, meaning that the disability system places 
greater weight on the opinion of the applicant’s treating doctor, seems to predict lower 
cut-points in rating work limitation severity among its residents. This inclusive style 
applies to the middle and the right end of the work limitation distribution (cut-points 2, 
3 and 4). 
The effects of vocational assessment policy are large with the effects concentrated in 
the first three thresholds. Under a disability regime with relatively lenient vocational 
assessment, that is, eligibility for disability benefits is based on inability to do one’s 
usual occupation (rather than any job available), a respondent seems to be more likely 
to classify a given health problem as work limiting except when it comes to rating 
extremely severe health problems. 
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Table 4. Estimated coefficients on disability policy generosity (multiple policy dimensions) in generalized ordered 
probit model of respondents’ rating of vignette characters’ work disability
Thresholds Equation (Equation (2))
Cut-point 1 Cut-point 2 Cut-point 3 Cut-point 4
Not at all limited ≥ Mildly 
limited
Mildly limited  ≥ Moderately 
limited 
Moderately 
limited ≥ Severely limited
Severely limited  
≥  Extremely limited
Disability Policy
Coverage & Max. benefit level -0.053*** -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.037***
Disability levels for full 
disability -0.040*  0.124***  0.145***  0.030*
Permanence of benefits -0.072*** -0.115*** -0.141*** -0.030***
Medical assessment  0.084*** -0.127*** -0.179*** -0.040***
Vocational assessment -0.154*** -0.192*** -0.143***  0.034*
Min. disability level & Sickness 
benefit & Unemployment 
benefit
-0.058*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.031***
Demographics and Education
Female  0.035**  0.091***  0.081***  0.029
Age56–60 -0.013 -0.001  0.025  0.02
Age 61–65 -0.021  0.029  0.074***  0.153***
Age 66–70 -0.006 -0.006  0.034*  0.096***
Age 70+ -0.056** -0.039**  0.066***  0.224***
Years of education -0.026*** -0.006***  0.001  0.013***
Health
High blood pressure -0.047*** -0.024* -0.001 -0.009
Diabetes  0.001 -0.034* -0.055*** -0.111***
Cancer  0.025  0.024  0.049**  0.122***
Lung problems  0.017 -0.023  0.013  0.042
Heart conditions -0.063*** -0.038** -0.022  0.02
Arthritis -0.049*** -0.01  0.006  0.050**
Number of ADL limitation -0.057*** -0.032*** -0.026** -0.107***
Number of IADL limitation  0.011  0.005 -0.028** -0.032*
Obese -0.002 -0.037** -0.064*** -0.102***
Occupation
Ref: Managerial/Professional 
specialty
Technical/Sales/Administrative 
support -0.029 -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.031
Service  0.021 -0.086*** -0.105*** -0.213***
Farming/Fishing/Forestry  0.048  0.084** -0.033 -0.083
Precision production/Craft/
Repair -0.068** -0.03 -0.051** -0.088***
Operators/Fabricators/Laborers -0.033 -0.033 -0.106*** -0.189***
Elementary occupation -0.075* -0.070** -0.069*** -0.149***
Constant -0.780***  0.598***  1.664***  1.576***
Notes: In this estimation, we pool the responses from all the countries together and the total number of observations is 6,652. We included in the 
estimation an indicator for missing occupation information. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Disability levels for full disability benefits show remarkably different effects on 
reporting styles. More lenient standards to determine disability levels for full disability 
benefits are associated with stricter rating styles for work limitations. The effects are 
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concentrated in the middle of the work limitation distribution (cut-points 2 and 3). 
However, the sign of the effects seems counterintuitive. 
While looking at the effects of disability policy generosity and other country-level 
factor, we also control for a series of respondents’ characteristics in the estimation 
because reporting heterogeneity may be related to differences in population 
demographics, socioeconomic characteristics, and health distribution in each country. 
We test whether the predictive power of disability policy generosity is robust to 
including these respondents’ individual-level factors. 
Our model (in Table 4) controls for standard respondents’ demographic covariates: 
gender, age (in groups), education (in years), and a series of health indicators (high 
blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung problems, heart problems, arthritis, obesity, and 
number of Activity of Daily Living or ADL limitations, and number of Instrumental 
Activity of Daily Living or IADL limitations). Work disability is not purely a health 
indicator but also depends on the work context. So we also include seven dummies 
for occupation (technical/sales/administrative support, service, farming/fishing/
forestry, precision production/craft/repair, operators/fabricators/laborers, elementary 
occupation, and managerial/professional specialty as omitted/reference occupation). 
Some of these individual-level factors significantly predict vignette rating styles, but 
they do not reduce the predictive power of disability policy generosity.
3.3 Counterfactual Simulations of the Effects of Disability Policy 
Generosity
Having estimated the cut-points adjusted for country-level and individual-level factors, 
we impose the estimated response scales on the model for self-reported work disability. 
We want to see whether allowing reporting heterogeneity affects the distribution of 
self-reported work disability. Specifically we focus on the disability policy effects on 
the response scale which in turn shifts the distribution of self-reported disability in the 
country. We illustrate such an impact with policy simulations and demonstrate whether 
changing a country’s disability institutional environment would affect what the 
population’s (self-reported) disability distribution looks like. The results are presented 
in Figure 3. In particular, we show how the disability severity distribution in the U.S. 
would look like if the U.S. were to adopt other European countries’ disability policy. 
We carry out such simulations for every policy dimension, except for policies 2 and 
8–10 which we combine since they are so highly correlated and reflect a country’s 
overall policy towards milder work limitations. All the disability severity distributions 
in the graphs are adjusted by demographics, health conditions and occupations in the 
U.S. The exercise performed here is more of a comparative analysis than a simulation. 
We do not consider any feed-back effect if different policies could change people’s 
behavior.
The first graph depicts the policy simulation results for the first policy dimension, 
disability policy coverage. The U.S. disability programs cover the labor force plus 
a means-tested program. The U.S programs score 3 in terms of their generosity 
according to OECD and rank in the middle compared to the other countries. If the U.S. 
were to adopt Sweden’s coverage policy, which is the most generous, and covers not 
only the labor force but the whole population, the simulation shows significant increase 
in the likelihood of Americans reporting disability. The most pronounced change is an 
increase of more than 10 percentage points (from 33.5 percent to 44.2 percent) in the 
proportion of Americans reporting mild work disability, and a drop of more than 10 
percentage points in the proportion reporting no disability. 
The reporting pattern changes in a similar fashion except with smaller magnitude if 
we applied the more generous coverage in the Netherlands, where more than the labor 
force is covered but not the whole population, as compared to the U.S. Tightening 
the U.S. disability policy to cover only the part of the labor force that is self-insured, 
similar to the German policy, would make fewer people covered and possibly less 
likely to characterize their health conditions as work disabling, at least according to the 
coverage standard of the public disability programs. As shown in the graph, about 5 
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Figure 3. Predicted disability severity distribution by country
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percent of the American population would shift their disability reporting from mild to 
none if the U.S. adopted the German disability coverage policy. 
The second graph presents the simulation results for the policy dimension of 
disability levels for full benefits. In general, lower disability threshold for full benefits 
seems to be associated with greater likelihood of reporting work disability and the 
effect is concentrated in the mild disability category. However, the overall effect is only 
moderate, which is consistent with what the OECD (2003) finds: although different 
levels of work incapacity are required for full benefits, the proportions of people 
receiving full benefits are very similar across countries. It suggests that the specified 
incapacity levels are just a reference point for people to evaluate the relatively severe 
work limitations, and the variations in the specific incapacity levels between countries 
do not seem to matter much.
The third graph shows that changing the maximum disability benefit level would 
mainly affect the rate of reporting mild and moderate/severe work limitations. On 
average, a one-point increase in the generosity of maximum disability benefit level 
is associated with 1 to 2.5 percentage point drop in self-reported mild disability, and 
about 2 percentage point upswing in the rate of reporting moderate or severe disability. 
The overall impact seems to be only modest of changing the maximum disability 
benefit level on the way people rate work limitations. 
In the fourth graph, we find that more permanent benefits shift the distribution of the 
self-assessed disability severity towards the more severe end. The most distinct change 
appears in the proportion of the population reporting no disability, which reduces by 
2 to 3 percentage points for a one-unit increase in the generosity score for the more 
permanent benefits. Apparently, the permanence of the benefits has only limited effects 
on disability reporting. 
In the fifth graph, we observe that more lenient medical assessment is associated with 
higher rate of reporting moderate and severe work disabilities, but it is also associated 
with higher rate of reporting no work disability and much lower rate of reporting mild 
work disability. A medical assessment is considered more lenient if the process places 
more weight on the treating doctor’s opinion and less likely involves insurance doctor. 
Every one-unit increase in the generosity score of the medical assessment would lead 
to a 1.3- to 2.5- percentage point increase in reporting moderate or severe disability, 
and at the same time a 3.5- to 5-percentage point increase in reporting no disability. 
This is interesting and may reflect heterogeneous effects in the population: On the one 
hand, generous medical assessments in the country’s public disability evaluation may 
make some people more likely to classify a given health problem as work limiting; on 
the other hand, the more relaxed medical assessment in the disability system may be 
viewed as excessive by others, making them reluctant to rate a given health problem as 
disabling. 
In the sixth graph, more relaxed vocational assessment is associated with more 
reporting of moderate and severe disabilities and less reporting of no disability. A 
one-unit increase in the generosity score of vocational assessment would raise the 
proportion reporting moderate disabilities by 4.5 to 7.8 percentage points and the 
proportion reporting severe disabilities by 1 to 2 percentage points, and reduce the rate 
of reporting no disability by 4.3 to 5.7 percentage points. 
A vocational assessment is considered stricter if all the available jobs in the national 
economy, not only one’s own previous occupation, are considered in evaluating a 
disability applicant’s residual work capacity. The vocational assessment in the U.S. 
is strict: to qualify for the federal disability benefits, an applicant has to be deemed 
unable to do any jobs available in the national economy. In other words, only 
individuals who do not have residual work capacity would qualify for benefits. In most 
European countries, the disability system uses one’s previous earnings or occupations 
as reference when determining the individual’s eligibility for benefits, especially for 
partial benefits. 
In the simulation, we relax the strict U.S. vocational standard to allow the applicants 
to engage in a different type of work (likely less demanding) than their previous 
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occupation and to still qualify to receive benefits. It perhaps would foster a culture of 
continued attachment to the labor force among people with work limitations in the U.S. 
and then implant among the general public an idea that work and disability are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. In time, that idea would likely affect the way that the 
public perceives and classifies disability. For example, the general public, who used 
to call milder health problems “no disability”, would now define them as “mild” or 
“moderate” disability, as suggested by the simulation result.
In the last graph, we pool together several policy dimensions (minimum disability 
level, sickness benefit and unemployment benefit) because they are highly correlated 
and represent the eligibilities for less severe disability cases. Depending on the 
specific rules in a country, a worker struck by milder work limitations could apply for 
unemployment benefits, relatively short-term sickness benefits, or some lower level of 
disability benefits from the public disability program. Our simulation shows that a one-
unit increase in the generosity score summarizing these policy aspects, that is, in terms 
of the systems awarding lower level of disability, would increase the rate of reporting 
moderate disabilities by 1.3 to 3.1 percentage points and lower the rate of reporting no 
disability by 1.8 to 2.6 percentage points. 
4 Discussion
Disability programs are a substantial and rising component of public social 
expenditures and an important dimension of the social safety net in many developed 
countries. A large literature has focused on estimating the effects of disability policy 
generosity on people’s behavior, such as labor market participation and disability 
benefit claiming. In this paper, we try to understand how differences in the disability 
institutional arrangements affects the general public’s views about work disability, an 
aspect that has received little attention before in disability policy studies. 
We first use an anchoring vignette approach to study the role of response scale 
heterogeneity. We find evidence that, compared to their European counterparts, 
Americans apply a less inclusive scale to their assessment of work limitations, i.e., they 
are less inclined to see a given condition as work limiting. The results are consistent 
with Kapteyn et al. (2007) who found Dutch respondents have lower thresholds in 
reporting work disability than American respondents. We further explore the possible 
mechanisms for disability reporting heterogeneity among countries. We show that the 
different reporting styles could be linked to the generosity of disability policies. For 
example, the less inclusive disability rating styles among Americans than Europeans 
are associated with the stricter disability policies in the U.S. compared to the European 
countries. Previous research that utilizes vignette data to study disability reporting 
heterogeneity has paid little attention to understanding the underlying mechanisms of 
the observed reporting differences across countries. The two exceptions that have paid 
attention to the mechanisms either find insignificant effects (Angelini, Cavapozzi and 
Paccagnella (2012) who have attributed reporting differences to variations in public 
disability expenditures across countries) or do not formally model the mechanisms 
(Kapteyn, Smith and van Soest (2009) who have linked reporting differences to work 
norms across countries). 
Our counterfactual policy simulation results suggest an overall positive correlation 
between disability policy generosity and disability reporting. That is, more lenient 
disability policies are associated with higher likelihood of reporting disabilities. 
Different policy dimensions affect the disability classifications in different ways, and 
the most influential policy dimensions in affecting disability reporting are the policy 
coverage, medical assessment, and vocational assessment. Specifically, more extensive 
policy coverage is associated with significantly more reporting of mild disability and 
less reporting of no disability. More lenient vocational assessments are predicted to 
result in substantial increases in reporting of moderate and severe disabilities and much 
less reporting of no disability. Medical assessment does not have such monotonic 
effects over the disability severity distribution. More relaxed medical assessment 
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appears to relate to a modest upswing in reporting moderate/severe disabilities and, at 
the same time, to a much higher rate of reporting no disability.
These findings have important policy implications. For example, when the medical 
or vocational assessment procedures are changed, in addition to directly affecting 
individuals’ medical and vocational qualifications for disability benefits, over time it 
would also possibly affect how the general public assesses work disabilities medically 
and vocationally, especially as time goes by and the policy changes gradually shape 
the disability culture in the country. 
More work-oriented disability policy will likely foster a culture of work in the wake 
of health limitations. This culture could then quickly evolve over time: when few 
workers with health impairments take up the work incentives in the disability policy, 
information is scarce and participation rises slowly. As information accumulates, the 
effect of employment among the health impaired individuals becomes less uncertain 
and the participation rate increases. 
Here we focused on how longstanding policies and institutions may influence 
cultural beliefs, rather than the reverse relationship. Culture and institutions are 
likely interrelated in a complex way. A country shares specific cultural values, such 
as attitude towards work, sense of solidarity, and preference for redistribution, which 
may lead to the emergence of particular disability institutions. Then, in turn, certain 
disability institutions will lead to the survival of certain cultural values and affect 
the social norms towards work disability. Individuals acquire information about the 
institutions through social learning, including learning about the policies and assessing 
the policy results over time. 
Given the two-way relationship between policy and beliefs, the effects that we 
estimate from disability policies to disability perceptions are likely an upper bound 
of the policy effects. We are not able to analyze the co-evolution of disability policies 
and disability vignette ratings. For institutions to transform cultural values, it could 
take a very long time. The main disability institutions in the countries under study here 
have remained mostly unchanged. Hence, it is plausible to think that the social norms 
about work disability in those countries have gradually come into being under the 
influence of the consistent disability institutions in the country. In the future, as data 
become available on the evolution of both institutions and cultural values, we hope that 
researchers will revisit these questions to more fully understand the complementarities 
between disability culture and disability institutions and the dynamic effects of 
disability reform on disability culture. 
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a comparative analysis of disability policy in the U.S. and 
seven European countries and using an anchoring vignette approach, we investigate 
whether different views held by the general public regarding what constitutes a 
work disability are related to cross-country differences in disability policies. We find 
evidence consistent with the correlation between disability policy generosity and 
public perceptions about work limitations. A closer look at the correlations reveal that 
the way people classify disability does not correlate with each policy dimension in the 
same fashion. The most influential policy dimensions in affecting disability reporting 
are policy coverage, medical assessment, and vocational assessment. Specifically, 
more extensive policy coverage and more lenient vocational assessments in a country 
are linked to its residents rating more vignettes cases as relatively severe disabilities, 
while a country’s more lenient medical evaluations are associated with its citizens 
classifying more vignettes characters as not disabled at all. Our study has demonstrated 
an important pathway through which a country’s disability policy interacts with its 
general public, an effect that we should keep in mind while designing and reforming 
disability programs.
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Appendix A
OECD Countries’ Disability Programs: Benefit Structures and Policy 
Lessons
Many OECD countries have long used partial disability benefits as a way to encourage 
people to remain in work, or to return to employment. Most countries with such 
systems, including some Nordic (Finland, Norway, and Sweden), western (Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Switzerland), and central and eastern European countries (Czech 
Republic, Greece, and Hungary), and Korea, offer a full benefit to those assessed to 
be fully unable to work and various degrees of partial benefits consistent with reduced 
work capacity. Most countries offer one to four levels of partial benefits, while some 
use a finer grid (e.g. in 5% intervals for work capacity reduction of 50%–94% in 
Norway). Partial work capacity is defined in different ways across countries, for 
example, in terms of the number of hours a person is permitted to work (Germany and 
Sweden) or in relation to the remaining percentage of work/earnings capacity. 
Other countries, including France, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, have a quasi-partial 
benefit for people who are unable to work in their usual occupation and a full benefit 
only for those unable to work in any occupation. Hence, the capacity threshold is the 
same for both benefits but the reference is different. The partial benefit is allowed 
to be supplemented to some extent by earnings from a job in another occupation. 
Luxembourg has a similar quasi-partial benefit system but the scheme is somewhat 
more generous where the full benefit eligibility is measured against former occupation 
and the partial benefit eligibility is gauged with respect to the last workplace.
Not all the OECD countries have partial benefits in their main disability program. 
Some countries offer a full benefit to individuals who have fully or partially lost 
work capacity, such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, New Zealand, Mexico, Slovak 
Republic, and Turkey. These systems award full benefits to individuals with earnings 
capacity reduced below a certain threshold, such as 50% in Austria and Mexico, 66% 
in Belgium, and 40% in Slovak Republic and Turkey, or a threshold defined by the 
number of hours a person can still work, as in Australia and New Zealand. 
Other countries that do not have partial benefits in the main disability program, 
e.g., Canada, Denmark (after 2003), Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom, adopt a very 
strict disability definition, one similar to that in the U.S. disability benefits system. 
However, unlike the U.S., these countries usually have a universal sickness program 
as a precursor to the long-term disability program and also more alternative public 
programs to match their disability program. For example, while the Italian disability 
pension scheme only awards full benefits to people totally unable to work (those with 
100% total and permanent incapacity to perform any work), there is a means-tested 
disability allowance that compensates partial work-capacity loss.
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Despite the different benefit structures, the OECD countries have all become 
increasingly convinced that it is important to identify and utilize residual work 
capacity of people with health limitations. In principle, people with a partially-reduced 
work capacity should not leave the labor force and should be supported to find or 
remain in work. This would help ensure social integration, raise these individuals’ 
living standards and maintain effective labor supply in the face of an aging population. 
However, in reality, the participation rates of disabled people are often low and not 
increasing even when the employment rates are increasing for the general working-age 
population in most countries. On the one hand, economic and labor market changes, 
such as job requirements changes, perhaps play a role in hindering health-limited 
individuals from remaining in or returning to work. On the other hand, inadequate 
policies are one important reason for the low employment rates of these partially 
disabled individuals. The OECD countries’ disability systems have predominately 
focused on people’s work disabilities, rather than work capacity, which has made 
the systems passive in fostering work. Assessment procedures and benefit systems 
often push disabled people with significant work capacity into long-term benefit 
dependency. Countries are increasingly aware of this problem. Many have started to 
change the approach for those with partial work capacity with a goal of promoting 
their employment and steering them away from benefit dependency and labor market 
exclusion.
Appendix Table A1.  Correlation between generosity of each disability policy dimension and vignettes classifying
 
Percentage of respondents 
classifying the vignettes as Not at 
All Limited
Percentage of respondents 
classifying the vignettes as Mildly 
or Moderately Limited
Percentage of respondents 
classifying the vignettes as Severely 
or Extremely Limited
Policy 1 -0.145 -0.145  0.164
Policy 2 -0.439 -0.094  0.192
Policy 3  0.060  0.091 -0.096
Policy 4 -0.139 -0.139  0.157
Policy 5  0.054 -0.122  0.095
Policy 6  0.381 -0.067 -0.035
Policy 7 -0.199  0.086 -0.027
Policy 8 -0.272 -0.021  0.086
Policy 9 -0.503 -0.091  0.205
Policy 10 -0.445 -0.156  0.249
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